Valukas Report On The Lehman Brothers Collapse

Lehman Brothers is back in the news in a big way after the report on the reasons for the investment bank's collapse in September 2008 submitted by Anton R. Valukas, the examiner appointed by the  US Bankruptcy Trustee, was released the other day. According to this website, the 2,200-page report took one year to prepare by a team of 70+ contract attorneys and cost $38 million.

There are quick summaries and detailed commentaries available from numerous financial news sites and blogs, if you don't particularly enjoy wading through a mean 9-volume report. Neither do I, but there's something about poring over the raw report and forming my own opinion therefrom that I find challenging, so I've started reading the Valukas report. I'll probably write something about my own take on this matter in a later post.

Now, for those of you who'd like to get a flavor of the original report, too, I've embedded below for your convenience the complete 9-volume report on Lehman Brothers' collapse which I found at Scribd.com. Here's a guide to the contents of each volume, to give you an overview of the report's coverage and help those who may want to skip sections and read selectively:

Volume 1- Sections I and II: Introduction, Executive Summary and Procedural Background 
               - Section III.A.1: Risk
Volume 2- Section III.A.2: Valuation
               - Section III.A.3: Survival
Volume 3- Section III.A.4: Repo 105
Volume 4- Section III.A.5: Secured Lenders
               - Section III.A.6: Government
Volume 5- Section III.B: Avoidance Actions
               - Section III.C: Barclays Transaction
Volume 6- Appendix 1
Volume 7- Appendices 2 - 7
Volume 8- Appendices 8 - 22
Volume 9- Appendices 23 - 34
Lehman Brothers Examiners Report COMBINED

Chinese Yuan vs. the US demand - Economics Theory

The conventional wisdom is that once the value of the Chinese Yuan is increased, the USA’s trade deficit with China would start falling. This reasoning has prompted many Americans to push for further, faster revaluation of the Yuan even after China changed its currency policy.

For those who endorse this rationale, the Yuan’s value is a paramount factor behind China’s, and their country’s trade balances.

But for John Ross, former deputy mayor of London in charge of economic and business policy, the trade gap between a country and China would widen instead of narrowing down, at least in the short term, if the Yuan’s values go up.

Mr. Ross, a visiting professor at Antai College of Economics and Management in Shanghai Jiaotong University, says that once the Yuan’s value rises the Americans would demand further revaluation, ultimately forcing the Yuan to rise to a level that would not only disrupt China’s trade and economy, but also pose a threat to the entire World’s economy.

Moreover, the number of jobs in the US would not increase unless the federal government changes its economic policy and raises investments, which is the real solution to its problem. Pressuring China to raise the Yuan’s value sharply will not help. “Most people, particularly those abroad, don’t know the real situation. The reason they want the Yuan to be revaluated further is because they think it would reduce China’s trade surplus, this is simply not true.”

From what happened between Y’s 2005 and 2008, when the Yuan rose 21% against the USD, it’s clear that China’s “trade surplus rose, too”, Ross said. Any revaluation of the Yuan raises the price of exports and reduces the price of imports, which means China’s trade surplus would get bigger as its currency rises.

By examining historical data, Ross has found that China’s exports and imports grew simultaneously after Y 2005 in terms of volume, but the prices of exports rose more relative to import thanks to the revaluation of the yuan. “That’s why its trade surplus with the USA is bigger today.”

There’s a big debate among economists over what would happen in the long term if the Yuan rose further, he says. Some people think China’s trade surplus would increase, while others think it would fall in the long run. “But there’s no difference in what they say would happen in the short term.”

Seen from the history of US trade, its overall trade deficit rose at nearly US$70B a month until Y 2006, he says. Then it stabilized before rising again after the passage of the worst period of the Global financial crisis. “That’s why the American people are getting agitated because it has worsened, but it is not rising because of China, for, I’m using US figures, not Chinese figures, the trade surplus of China with the US is rather stable, slightly under US$20B a month.”

In other words, claiming that the trade deficit of the US is rising because of China is simply not true, he says. “It’s because its America’s trade deficit with the rest of the world is rising, too.”

The US has a trade deficit with about 90 countries. “If you reduce its trade deficit with China, all that would happen is that its trade deficit with some other country would increase.”

US hawks, however, have always targeted China and pressured it to dance to the tune of their demand. Even if China has pledged to make the yuan more flexible by reforming its exchange rate mechanism further and peg it to a basket of currencies to better reflect the demand of the market, some US politicians and industrial leaders say it’s “too little too late” and demand the Chinese currency be revaluated by up to 40 percent.

Forcing the value of the yuan to rise would cause further uncertainties in the world economy, which today faces other big challenges such as the European Union debt crisis. “We are not (living) in a normal stable economic environment; we are just about recovering from a very bad financial crisis and what happens in the next 6 to 18 months is very important and would have a very big effect,” he says. “The last thing the world needs at present is a short-term increase in China’s trade surplus because of an increase in the value of the yuan.”

China's Secret Recipe - Economics Theory

BEIJING -- China’s GDP growth this year may approach 10%. While some countries are still dealing with economic crisis or its aftermath, China’s challenge is, once again, how to manage a boom.

Thanks to decisive policy moves to preempt a housing bubble, the real-estate market has stabilized, and further corrections are expected soon. This is good news for China’s economy, but disappointing, perhaps, to those who assumed that the government would allow the bubble to grow bigger and bigger, eventually precipitating a crash.

Whether or not the housing correction will hit overall growth depends on how one defines "hit." Lower asset prices may slow total investment growth and GDP, but if the slowdown is (supposedly) from 11% to 9%, China will avoid economic over-heating yet still enjoy sustainable high growth. Indeed, for China, the current annualized growth rate of 37% in housing investment is very negative. Ideally, it would slow to, say, 27% this year!

China has sustained rapid economic growth for 30 years without significant fluctuations or interruption -- so far. Excluding the 1989-1990 slowdown that followed the Tiananmen crisis, average annual growth over this period was 9.45%, with a peak of 14.2% in 1994 and 2007, and a nadir of 7.6% in 1999.

While most major economies in their early stages of growth suffered crises, China’s story seems abnormal (or accidental), and has elicited periodic predictions of an "upcoming crash." All such predictions have proved wrong, but the longer the story lasts, the more people forecast a bad end.

For me, there is nothing more abnormal about China’s unbroken pattern of growth than effective macroeconomic intervention in boom times.

To be sure, both economic development and institutional reforms may cause instability. Indeed, the type of central government inherited from the old planned economy, with its overstretched growth plans, causes fluctuations, and contributed significantly to instability in the early 1980s.

But the central government must be responsible for inflation in times of overheating, lest a bursting bubble fuel unemployment. Local governments and state-owned enterprises do not necessarily have those concerns. They want high GDP growth, without worrying much about the macroeconomic consequences. They want to borrow as much as possible to finance ambitious investment projects, without worrying much about either repayment or inflation.

Indeed, the main cause of overheating in the early 1990s was over-borrowing by local governments. Inflation soared to 21% in 1994 -- its highest level over the past 30 years -- and a great deal of local debt ended up as non-performing loans, which amounted to 40% of total credits in the state banking sector in the mid-1990s. This source of vulnerability has become less important, owing to tight restrictions imposed since the 1990s on local governments’ borrowing capacity.

Now, however, the so-called "animal spirits" of China’s first generation of entrepreneurs have become another source of overheating risk. The economy has been booming, income has been rising, and markets have been expanding: all this creates high potential for enterprises to grow; all want to seize new opportunities, and every investor want to get rich fast. They have been successful and, so far, have not experienced bad times. So they invest and speculate fiercely without much consideration of risk.

The relatively high inflation of the early 1990s was a warning to central government policymakers about the macroeconomic risks posed by fast growth. The bubble bursts in Japan’s economy in the early 1990s, and the Southeast Asian economies later in the decade, provided a neighborly lesson to stop believing that bubbles never burst.

Since then, the central government’s policy stance has been to put brakes on the economy whenever there is a tendency toward over-heating. Stringent measures were implemented in the early 1990s to reduce the money supply and stop over-investment, thereby heading off hyperinflation.

In the recent cycle, the authorities began cooling down the economy as early as 2004, when China had just emerged from the downturn caused by the SARS scare in 2003. In late 2007, when GDP growth hit 13%, the government adopted more restrictive anti-bubble policies in industries (steel, for example) and asset markets (real estate), which set the stage for an early correction.

Economic theory holds that all crises are caused by bubbles or overheating, so if you can manage to prevent bubbles, you can prevent crises. The most important thing for "ironing out cycles" is not the stimulus policy implemented after a crash has already occurred, but to be proactive in boom times and stop bubbles in their early stages.

I am not quite sure whether all Chinese policymakers are good students of modern economics. But it seems that what they have been doing in practice happened to be better than what their counterparts in some other countries were doing -- a lot on "de-regulation," but too little on cooling things down when the economy was booming and bubbles were forming.

The problem for the world economy is that everybody remembered Keynes’s lesson about the need for countercyclical policies only when the crisis erupted, after demanding to be left alone -- with no symmetric policy intervention -- during the preceding boom. But managing the boom is more important, because it addresses what causes crises in the first place.

In a sense, what China has been doing seems to me to be the creation of a true "Keynesian world": more private business and freer price competition at the micro level, and active countercyclical policy intervention at the macro level.

There may be other factors that could slow down or interrupt China’s growth. I only hope that policymakers’ vigilance will prevail (and be improved upon), enabling China’s high-growth story to continue for another 10, 20, or 30 years.

Fan Gang is professor of Economics at Beijing University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, director of China’s National Economic Research Institute, secretary-general of the China Reform Foundation, and a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People’s Bank of China.

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